The Internal Revenue System has issued a Generic Legal Advice Memorandum (a “GLAM”) saying that “NIL Collectives” formed to help collegiate athletes monetize their “name, image and likeness” assets are probably not eligible for charitable exemption because they will in many cases be operating for a substantial non-exempt purpose, serving the private interests of the student-athletes. (AM 2023-004, 6/9/23.)  The GLAM has caused a significant uproar in the college athletics world.

Trustees of a charitable trust making distributions to support a public garden and several colleges waited too long to seek a review of a 2003 settlement agreement, approved by a court, that allocated the distributions among the beneficiaries.  The Supreme Court of Alabama has dismissed a petition from the trustees to increase the support of the gardens.

A former executive of a Washington, D.C. private foundation has been permitted to pursue claims against the Foundation for violation of a non-disparagement agreement made as part of a settlement of her claims of discrimination when she was fired.  A divided D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has reversed a District Court decision dismissing the claims against the Foundation and a defamation claim against the Foundation’s CEO.

A nonprofit behavioral health organization taking over the program of another provider did not discriminate against a pregnant employee when it specifically offered her a position following her maternity leave, even if there was some confusion in negotiating the terms of the position.  An appellate court in New Jersey has affirmed a trial court decision in the case.

The Tax Court has declined to take the opportunity to decide whether a “substantial” non-qualifying purpose is sufficient to deny exemption as a 501(c)(4) social welfare organization or whether the non-qualifying activity must be the “primary” activity of the organization. 

A volunteer director of a nonprofit homeowner’s association has not alleged facts that would constitute “employment” by the association and is therefore not entitled to protection under Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act, a magistrate judge in Pennsylvania has ruled.  The judge has dismissed a claim for harassment and retaliation but allowed the director to amend the complaint if she can bring herself within the definition of an employee.